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Abstract 
Increasingly the governments are facing pressures to increase budgetary allocations to 
social sectors.  Recently there has been suggestion to increase the government budget 
allocations to health sector and increase it to 3 per cent of GDP.  Is this feasible goal 
and in what time-frame?   Health being State subject in India and much depends on the 
ability of the State governments to allocate higher budgetary support to health sector.  
This inter alia depends on what are current levels of spending, what target spending as 
per cent of income the States assume to spend on health and given fundamental 
relationship between income levels and public expenditures, how fast expenditures can 
respond to rising income levels.  We present analysis of public expenditures on health 
using state level public health expenditure data to provide preliminary analysis on these 
issues.  The findings suggest that at state level governments have target of allocating 
only about 0.43 per cent of SGDP to health and medical care.  This does not include 
the allocations received under central sponsored programmes such as family welfare.  
Given this level of spending at current levels and fiscal position of state governments 
the goal of spending 2 to 3 per cent of GDP on health looks very ambitious task.  The 
analysis also suggests that elasticity of health expenditure when SGDP changes in only 
0.68 which suggest that for every one percent increase in state per capita income the 
per capita public healthcare expenditure has increased by around 0.68 per cent. 
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1.  Introduction 
Increasingly the governments are facing pressures to increase the budgetary allocations 
to social sector.  Recently there has been suggestion to increase the budget allocations 
to health sector and increase it to 3 per cent of GDP.  Is this feasible goal?   We 
certainly need some understanding of the behaviour of public expenditures on health.  
Health is state subject in India and therefore analysis of public health expenditures by 
States assumes greater significance.  The analysis of health care expenditures in general 
has been a topic of research and discussion in recent times globally.  In particular, the 
relationship between the income and health care expenditure (HCE) has been focus of 
research for the reason that it helps us to understand the key determinants of 
healthcare expenditures and also provides insights into linkages between income 
variable on the one hand, and demand and supply side of health on the other.  Since in 
India we are talking about increasing the public expenditures on health to 3 per cent of 
GDP, this analysis would provide some insights into our proposed goal.   
One of the areas of this analysis has been focus on understanding the income elasticity 
of health expenditures.  This research has used standard demand theory framework.  
Since the seminal work of Newhouse (1977) which estimated the relationship between 
health care expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP), a large number of studies 
have been carried out to examine this relationship in different contexts and answer the 
question what makes health care expenditure to increase.  We are asking similar 
question in our context.  What are necessary and sufficient conditions for public health 
expenditures to increase?  One important determinant is income or GDP.  Most of the 
studies on this topic have been carried out in developed country context.  In some of 
those settings the health care costs have gone up significantly over the years and 
expenditure-income analysis provides some interesting insights into health policy 
issues.   A number of studies agree that there is a relationship between GDP and HCE 
in various.  These studies vary from country level analysis to a much-disaggregated   4
level like province or state level analysis.  Most of the studies in this field have focused 
on health care expenditure including both private and public expenditures. 
In India health is responsibility of State governments and therefore the budgets 
allocations of each State include the allocation to health sector programmes.  Besides 
this State governments also receive support from central government through central 
sponsored programmes and various national programmes.  In India the government 
budget allocations to health sector would reflect more of supply side factors than 
demand side.  Whereas the private sector health care expenditures would represent 
more of demand side conditions than supply side.  Hence, the analysis based on the 
combined expenditure may not be appropriate and may produce erroneous results.  
Moreover, by separately analysing them we get more insight into behaviour of 
expenditures and their determinants.  In this paper we focus on analysis of relationship 
between public healthcare expenditure and GDP using state level data.   
2.  Context of study 
Like in developed countries health care expenditure in India is also steadily increasing. 
However, public health expenditure has been grossly inadequate right from the 1940s.  
The government has been spending less than private expenditures on health.  The 
Bhore Committee report stated that per capita private expenditure on health was Rs. 
2.50 compared to a state per capita health expenditure of just Rs. 0.36 which is 1/7
th of 
private expenditures.   In the 1950s and 1960s private health expenditure was 83 per 
cent and 88 per cent of total health expenditure respectively
1.  Today also according to 
latest figures the proportion of public expenditure on health to GDP in India is only 
0.9 per cent of GDP while the average public spending of less-developed countries is 
2.8 per cent of GDP.  Only 17 per cent of all health expenditure in India is borne by 
the government, the rest being borne privately by the people, making it one of the 
most highly privatised healthcare systems of the world
2. 
Within India also we see that there is huge gap in different states in economic terms 
and also in terms of development of health sector.  Ahluwalia (2000) in his article raises 
this issue while analysing the performance of individual states.  The paper states, “The   5
economic performance of the individual states in post-reforms period has received less 
attention than it deserves in the public debate on economic policy. There is very lively 
debate in the academic world and in the press on our national economic performance 
and the success or failure of various aspects of national policies, but there is relatively 
little analysis of how individual states have performed over time and the role of state 
government policy in determining state level performance.”  We examine the state 
level public health expenditure.  In fact state as unit of study needs to be studied 
because of the following structural and methodological reasons:  
Structural and political issues 
India is a federal democracy in which the constitutional division of powers between the 
centre and the states make the states pre-eminent in many areas and co-equal with 
centre in other areas.  Health is State subject and state policies would have important 
bearing on the public health expenditures in India. Also nowadays government at the 
state level are run by different political parties and competition among them should 
make the performances of individual states a matter of high political and electoral 
interest. After liberalisation degree of control exercised by centre has been reduced in 
many areas leaving much greater scope for States to improve their performance level 
and initiatives. This is particularly true as far as attracting investments, both domestic 
and foreign, is concerned. 
Methodological issues 
Renenelt and Levine (1991) raise this question that what is the appropriate unit of 
study.  In particular, are countries the appropriate unit to study, or should we conduct 
analysis at a more disaggregated level?  Since countries are composed of states, any 
country’s growth rate will depend on the growth of its different states. A second issue 
with using country as a unit of study involves sampling. Regression analysis 
presupposes that data has been taken from a single population. It is not clear, however, 
whether states are indeed drawn from same population
3.  Different Indian states can be 
a part of the same analysis because they have several factors in common. They are 
broadly governed by the same legal system; they have same broad health policy devised 
by the central government; and have same constitution.  But there are also differences.  
The economic, social-cultural and political differences are there.  Thus a study at the   6
state level not only provides an opportunity for analysis at disaggregate level but also 
allows the assumption of regression analysis to be maintained (e.g., data points should 
be from the same population).  
3.  Literature Review 
There is a large literature dealing with issues related to health care expenditure. If we 
observe closely we can divide this literature into following broad categories.  
Studies related to relationship between health expenditure and income 
One important finding in earlier studies has been that the ratio of healthcare 
expenditure to GDP increased as countries were getting developed economically and 
industrially.  We can go to as back as in 1963 and 1967 when pioneering work of Abel-
Smith brought out this issue in World Health Organisation studies. They found that 
after adjusting for inflation, exchange rates and population, GDP is a major 
determinant of health expenditure. 
In a seminal paper Newhouse (1977) raises the question what determines the quantity 
of resources any country devotes to medical care.  The analysis provided suggests that 
per capita GDP of the country is the single most important factor affecting health 
expednitures. The study found a positive linear relationship between fraction of health 
care expenditure to GDP and GDP
4. Results of Newhouse were consistent with an 
earlier study by Kleiman (1974) and both these papers worked as a base for a large 
literature, which viewed income as a major determinant of health care expenditure. 
This result was also verified by lots of studies later on. 
Gerdtham et al. (1992) used a single cross section of nineteen OECD countries in 1987. 
They found per capita income, urbanisation, and the share of public financing to total 
health expenditure as positive and significant variables. Gbesemete and Gerdtham 
(1992) used a cross sectional sample of thirty African countries in 1984.  They found 
that per capita GNP was the most significant factor in explaining per capita health care 
expenditure.  Hitris and Posnett (1992) used 560 pooled time series and cross section 
observations from 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1987 and found a strong   7
and positive correlation between per capita health spending and GDP.  Later also many 
authors studied the performance of health expenditures.  Most of the works of these 
authors were based on the relationship between health care expenditure and GDP. 
Some important works, which we can mention here, are Hansen and King (1996), 
McKoskey and Selden (1998), Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000), Karatzas (2000).  
All of these studies agreed that health care expenditure is dependent on GDP of the 
country. Another very important aspect, which different authors tried to explain, was 
that whether health care expenditure is a necessity good or luxury good. 
 
Studies related to elasticity of health expenditure and income  
Whether healthcare is a luxury or necessity is very important from the point of view 
estimating future expenditure on healthcare. This is so because if health care is a luxury 
product it will consume an ever-increasing share of national income. It also has 
implications for the link between healthcare expenditure and economic well-being. 
Generally normal measures of health like infant mortality rate, death rate, morbidity 
etc. are more or less not very different for similar kind of countries (for example in 
OECD countries).  But health care spending may differ more than these normal 
measures. There can be a case that marginal utility of health care expenditure can be 
very low.  This comes out from the Engel’s curve
5 and Engel’s law
6. 
Newhouse (1977) argued that since the income elasticity of health care expenditure is 
greater than 1 therefore it could be treated as a “luxury” good.  This raised a major 
debate in the literature that whether health care is luxury or necessity.  Literature gives 
a contrasting view of the elasticity of health care expenditure with respect to income.  
Some studies (like Newhouse, 1977; Gerdtham et al., 1992) found the elasticity greater 
than one while many other studies (Manning et al., 1987; McLaughlin, 1987; Di Matteo 
and Di  Matteo, 1998) found elasticity much less than one.  Getzen (2000) in his paper 
analyses the literature and concludes that health care is neither “a necessity” nor “a 
luxury” but “both” since the income elasticity varies with the level of analysis.  With 
insurance individual income elasticities are typically near zero while that of nations is   8
mostly more than one.  Getzen (2000, Exhibit 1)
7 provides a summary of the work 
done in calculating the elasticity of health expenditure and GDP by the level of 
aggregation.  In general higher the level of aggregation higher is the income elasticity of 
health care expenditure.  However, the empirical evidence does not sustain this claim.  
A possible explanation for this result is the presence of an aggregation problem, in the 
sense that most of the studies in this area have focused exclusively on the analysis of 
health expenditures.  If we segregate both private and public healthcare expenditure 
and then try to calculate their elasticity then may be some more clarity will come on 
this issue. 
Studies on issues of stationarity and cointegration 
Many authors have studied performance of health function with majority of the work 
is based on the relationship between health care expenditure and the GDP.  Most of 
these studies use time series data.  Here we have to see that variables, which have been 
used, may not be stationary.  Therefore, the estimated relationships may be spurious.  
Before estimating the relationship many studies have focused on first examining the 
stationarity of the time series used in analysis.   Following this many studies have 
found that the time series under consideration are generally not stationary.  So the 
studies have used cointegration approach. A number of studies have been carried out 
using the cointegration approach.  But there is no unanimity between researchers 
regarding presence of cointegration between health expenditures and income.  
Contradictory results have been found by the authors. Gerdtham and Lothgren (2000) 
have made an attempt to examine these contradictions.  They showed that different 
conclusions regarding stationarity and cointegration between health expenditure and 
income in the previous studies were dependent on whether those studies were 
conducted on individual or pooled series and also whether time trends were included in 
the estimations.  Finally, they conclude that health expenditures and income for a 
panel of OECD countries have unit roots and they are cointegrated. Gertham and 
Lothgren did not, however, follow up their cointegration tests with estimates of 
elasticity of health care expenditure with respect to income (GDP), and so did not 
address the question of health’s status as a luxury or necessity good. However, results   9
of Gerdtham and Lothgren are not entirely free from criticism as shown by Taylor and 
Sarno (1998) or Banerjee et al. (2000). 
Studies related to use of Panel Data 
Initial studies used cross-sectional or time series data for the analysis. In more recent 
studies researchers (e.g. Gerdtham 1992, Hitris and Posnett 1992, Gertham et al. 1995, 
Getzen 2000) have used panel data.  Panel data sets for economic research possess 
several major advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets (e.g., 
Hsiao (1985a, 1995, 2000)). Main advantages of panel data are that they usually give a 
large number of data points, increasing the degree of freedom and reducing the 
collinearity among explanatory variables – hence improving the efficiency of 
econometric estimates. Longitudinal data allows analysing a number of important 
economic questions that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time series data 
sets, especially properties related to states and time specific effects.  The use of panel 
data also provides a means of resolving or reducing the magnitude of the problem of 
presence of omitted (unmeasured or unobserved) variables that are correlated with 
explanatory variables. 
Although panel data has many advantages, a problem can arise if several trending 
variables are present in panel data regressions for example health expenditure and 
GDP.  Philips (1986) showed that regressions involving non-stationary variables might 
lead to spurious results showing apparently significant relationships even if variables 
are generated independently.  However, if the variables are cointegrated the ordinary 
regression estimators turn out to be super consistent (Engle and Granger 1987). 
Studies related to health financing in India 
In India there are few studies which have touched upon the issue of healthcare 
financing and its nature.  First study was R.B. Lal’s Singpur study of private household 
expenditure, which talked about private expenditure on health in Singpur area and also 
what was the government healthcare expenditure for the same area (GOI, 1946).  The 
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad had carried out a study of health finance 
covering all the levels of health expenditure – state, municipal, corporate and 
household (IIM, 1987).  Another study of state health financing in India is that by   10
Roger Jefferey. He looked at state health expenditure from the perspective of planning 
– the administrative process involved in making allocations – and in context of policy 
changes.   Tulasidhar and Sarma (1993) did a comparative study of different states of 
India with respect to public expenditure, medical care at birth and infant mortality.  
They found that in all the states per capita real public spending grew faster than real 
per capita state domestic product.  Recently a number of studies have been done on the 
healthcare financing in India.  Duggal (1996) discusses the public-private participation 
in health sector and how this can be optimised for best results.  Bhat (1996, 2000) 
discusses about the importance of regulating the private sector in India and how public-
private partnership can bring needed resources while also taking care that the 
vulnerable groups – the poor and rural populations – have access to health facilities. 
These studies suggest that India’s dependence on private sector in healthcare is very 
high. Utilisation studies show that a third of in-patients and three fourths of out-
patients utilise private healthcare facilities (Duggal and Amin 1989; Yesudian 1990; 
Visaria and Gumber 1994).  
 
Dreze and Sen (1995) analysed life expectations at birth and they found substantial 
differences at birth across states Rajasthan have infant and socio-economic groupings. 
States such as Madhya Pradesh, Orissa have mortality rates of well over 100 per 1000 
live births in rural areas (Dreze and Sen 1995; Mahal, Srivastava and Sanan 2000). 
 
In another study Mahal et al. (2000) tried to find the distribution of public health 
subsidies in India in different states.  Despite a considerable desire for “equity” in 
public policy documents, they found that public subsidies on health are distributed 
quite unequally across different socio-economic groups in India.  At the all-India level, 
the share of the richest 20 per cent of the population in total public sector subsidies is 
nearly 31 per cent, nearly three times the share of the poorest 20 per cent of the 
population.  In rural areas this inequality was much greater where the share of the top 
20 per cent in public subsidies was nearly four times that of the poorest 20 per cent.  
Mahal et al. (2000) find that 31 per cent of public subsidies on health accrued to urban 
residents, somewhat higher than their share in the total population of about 25 per 
cent.  If we look at the state level then there also they found substantial differences in   11
the degree of inequality, with southern states such as Kerala, Tamilnadu and Andhra 
Pradesh, and the western states of Maharashtra and Gujarat enjoying a much more 
equal distribution than the north Indian states.  Some of this inequality in the 
allocation of public health subsidies can be explained by income-related differences in 
utilisation patterns of public facilities, with the rich using more care, if health care is a 
normal good. But if, however, promoting equity is a key objective of the state, there is 
no doubt that substantial scope for improvement remains, whether in terms of inter-
state equity, or within state distributions of public subsidies. 
Studies at state level of India 
There are very few studies, which takes states of India as the unit of analysis.  For 
example, Mitra and Varoudakis (2002) examined the effects of infrastructure on 
manufacturing industries’ total factor productivity and technical efficiency in the case 
of Indian states. They showed that differences in infrastructure endowments across 
Indian states explain in a significant way their differences in industrial performances. In 
another study, Datt and Ravallion (1998) study the rural poverty elimination in 
different states of India. They found that speed of rural poverty elimination has been 
diverse across different states. But there are very few studies of this kind.  
4.  Healthcare expenditure in India 
The Indian constitution charges the states with "the raising of the level of nutrition and 
the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health" (see The 
Constitutional Framework, Ch. 8). Central government efforts at influencing public 
health have focused on the five-year plans, on coordinated planning with the states, and 
on sponsoring major national health programs.  For most national health programmes 
government expenditures are jointly shared by the central and state governments. 
Healthcare expenditure is a very necessary social expenditure for any country.  Like 
any other social expenditure health expenditure also requires a significant contribution 
from the Government.  Whether it is a developed country or a developing one state’s 
role in developing a good health infrastructure and assuring good health to everybody 
becomes very critical and important.  The spending on health has major contributions 
coming from private households (75 per cent). State governments contribute 15.2   12
percent, the central government 5.2 percent, third-party insurance and employers 3.3 
percent, and municipal government and foreign donors about 1.3 (World bank 1995).  
Of these proportions, 58.7 percent goes toward primary health care (curative, 
preventive, and promotive) and 38.8 percent is spent on secondary and tertiary 
inpatient care.  The rest goes for non-service costs.  Table 1 provides comparison of 
public expenditures on health of various countries.   
Table 1:  Public expenditure on health  







The comparison of health expenditure with other countries suggests that India’s public 
health expenditure is only 17.9 per cent of total expenditure on health care while it is 
close to 90 per cent for smaller countries like Bhutan and Maldives. 
Centre and state roles in public healthcare expenditures 
The total public health care expenditure is composed of state level allocations and 
allocations from central government.  The central sponsored programmes have been 
one key policy initiative of the Government of India to support the health sector 
programmes directly.  The centre provides direct and partial (matching grant) support 
to the states in meeting both recurring and non-recurring expenditure of programmes 
under this policy initiative.   The states’ share in the total revenue expenditure has been 
declining.  This is also reflection of the fact that state governments are going through 
serious fiscal problems.  The role of central support in state budgetary allocations is 
increasing.  We can see from the following graphs that the percentage of State 
expenditure is decreasing in total health expenditure and the same is rising of central 
Country Percentage 
Bhutan 90.6 
Maldives   83.5 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea   73.4 
Timor-Leste   59.5 
Thailand   57.1 
Sri Lanka   48.9 
Bangladesh   44.2 
Nepal   29.7 
Indonesia   25.1 
India   17.9 
Myanmar   17.8   13
govt. expenditure, though the change is not very much in percentage terms (see Figures 
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Figure 2: Central Govt. Rev. Exp. On Health 
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As compared to these allocations, the private expenditure on healthcare is increasing.  
In fact in the past five six years it has grown exponentially.  From just Rs. 195 billion 
in 1994 it rose by more than five times to Rs. 1283 billion in 2003 (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Private Final Consumption on Health






























Trend of public healthcare expenditure at state level 
Per capita public healthcare expenditure in different states in India does not show any 
trend, expect in two states: Punjab and Kerala.  State government revenue expenditure 
for medical and healthcare increased from just around Rs. 50 billion in 1992 to more 
than 150 billion in 2001, an increase of more than three times in a decade (see Figure 5).  
One observation, which we can easily make by analysing Figure 4, is that around 1996 
there was a sharp dip in public healthcare expenditures (PHCE) across all states (as 
shown by dotted line is Figure 4).  After that PHCE again rose.  Best example of this 
we can see in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh states.  Bihar and UP two backward but one 
of the largest states shows that here also they have one of the lowest PHCE among all 
states consistently, even smaller states like Kerala and Assam spends more than these 
two states.  One reason of this can be that these two are one of the poorest states.  
States like Tamilnadu, Rajasthan and Maharashtra does not show much fluctuation in   15
PHCE.  So broadly from the above graph we get the picture that PHCE does not vary 









































)Keeping in mind the sharp dip in 1996 if we divide the period being studied into two 
parts, from 1990 to 1996 and from 1996 to 2002, then we can actually try to see that by 
what extent PHCE varied in these two time periods and also for the whole time 
period.  This analysis is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Growth of Public Healthcare Expenditure (PHCE) Per Capita  
(in real terms) 
 Change*  Percentage  Change 
  1990-1996 1996-2002 1990-2002 1990-1996 1996-2002 1990-2002 
Andhra Pradesh  -211.1 263.4  52.3  -28.16%  48.92%  06.98% 
Assam  3.4 -15.5 -12.1  00.56%  -02.56%  -02.01% 
Bihar  -111.7 160  48.2  -26.25%  50.96%  11.33% 
Gujarat  -156.6  110.3  -46.3  -17.48% 14.91% -05.17% 
Karnataka  -103.6 270.3 166.7  -13.23%  39.79%  21.30% 
Kerala  -73.2 172.2  99.1  -07.99%  20.43%  10.81% 
Madhya Pradesh  -103.6 161.1  57.5  -18.54%  35.41%  10.30% 
Maharashtra  -144.2 278.3 134.1  -16.80%  38.97%  15.62% 
Orissa  -186.9  154.3  -32.6  -30.32% 35.92% -05.29% 
Punjab  -414.9 583.8 168.9  -33.29%  70.20%  13.55% 
Rajasthan  -86.7 152.1  65.5  -10.95%  21.60%  08.28% 
Tamilnadu  -44.6 134.5  89.9  -05.07%  16.09%  10.20% 
Uttar Pradesh  -160  -5.3  -165.2  -26.40% -01.18% -27.27% 
West Bengal  -35.5 251.8 216.3  -05.69%  42.76%  34.64% 
All India (States)  -107.8 160.8  53.1  -14.90%  26.14%  07.34% 
* Figures are in Rs. millions     
 
From the above table few interesting point emerges. We see here that public health 
expenditure (PHCE) in real terms of all the states except Assam went down in the 
period 1990-96 but it increased during the period 1996-2002 for all states except Uttar 
Pradesh and Assam. Overall in this period PHCE increased for most of the states 
except Assam, Gujarat, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. 
But if we observe per capita health expenditure as a percentage of per capita Gross SDP 
(both in real terms) for the same period of time a different picture emerges.  The 





























oWhen we observe PHCE as a percentage of GSDP we notice that Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh does not fare very badly here.  In fact Bihar comes across as one of the state 
with highest ratio.  Here big states like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat comes 
have not done well.  States like Bihar, Assam, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab shows very 
high fluctuation in PHCE to GSDP ratio while some states like Maharashtra and 
Gujarat does not show much fluctuation.  We also see that that in 1996 there is a blip 
but this must be the result of fall in PHCE in 1996.  One thing which comes out from 
the above figure is that in almost all the states PHCE as a percentage of GSDP has not 
increased much during past decade. During the period 1994 to 2002 health care 
expenditure as a percentage of Gross SDP had in fact showing a declining trend.  
Keeping in mind the sharp dip in 1996 if we divide the period being studied into two 
parts, from 1990 to 1996 and from 1996 to 2002, then we can actually try to see that to 
what extent PHCE as a percentage of GSDP varied in these two time periods and also 
for the whole time period (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3:   Per cent change in PHCE/ GSDP ratio 
 1990-1996 1996-2002 1990-2002 
Andhra Pradesh  -40.51% 16.46% -30.72% 
Assam -05.79% -06.55% -11.96% 
Bihar -19.21% -05.14% -23.36% 
Gujarat -38.11% -07.95% -43.03% 
Karnataka -31.08% -00.33% -31.31% 
Kerala -31.20% -05.61% -35.07% 
Madhya Pradesh  -31.14% 18.24% -18.58% 
Maharashtra -37.15% 21.36% -23.72% 
Orissa -31.53% 16.30% -20.37% 
Punjab -40.24% 44.05% -13.91% 
Rajasthan -26.81% -00.74% -27.35% 
Tamilnadu -30.40% -11.56% -38.45% 
Uttar Pradesh  -28.96% -12.90% -38.12% 
West Bengal  -25.90% 03.49% -23.31% 
 
From the above table we can see that for all the states PHCE as a percentage of GSDP 
went down significantly in the period 1990-1996, for the period 1996-2002 again it 
went down except for Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab 
and West Bengal. But on the whole for entire period it went down for all the states.   20
From this a very important point emerges that government priority for health care 
expenditure is decreasing over the years in all the states which means that less and less 
money per capita is being spent by government on healthcare as a percentage of 
income (see Figure 6).  
The percentages decreases can be summarised as follows: 
% Decrease (1990-2002)  States 
More than 40%  Gujarat 
Between 30-40%  Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Tamilnadu 
Between 20-30%  Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan 
Less than 20%  Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Assam 
 
From the above table some interesting point emerges. Gujarat has maximum decrease 
in HCE as a percentage of income.  After that most of the southern states and Uttar 


































Figure 6: Percentage Decrease in PHCE - GSDP 
Ratio   21
Now from the above analysis a very important question emerges that why till 1996 
HCE was decreasing at a rapid rate and after that it increased again somewhat.  
Selvaraju (2000) discusses about data till 1996 and he says that from 1990 to 1996 there 
was a period of contraction on expenditure.  India started liberalisation and new 
economic policy in 1991 and at that point of time economic situation of country was 
in very bad state.  Therefore, due to fiscal pressures the expenditures got affected and 
healthcare expenditure was no exception of that.  But after 1996 again the situation 
improved and then that expenditure contraction period got over.  
5.  Methodology and data 
In order to estimate the relationship between income and public health care 
expenditure we use real per capita gross state domestic product (GSDP) to represent 
income and real per capita state public health expenditure (PHCE) on health.  For the 
purpose of analysis, health care expenditure refers mainly to expenditure incurred by 
states and does not include allocation of family welfare programme which is central 
sponsored programme.  The expenditure on health does not include water supply and 
sanitation.  We are, therefore, considering here only public health care expenditure.  
The data has been collected for each state.  For the purpose of this study we have 
included 14 states in our analysis.  The states included here account for more than 90 
percent of the total population of country.  The states included in the study are:  
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal
9.  
We are taking time period from 1990 to 2002 for the purpose of analysis. Data from 
various sources was collected for this purpose. Main sources were database maintained 
by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) and different Government 
publications.  Expenditure in real terms has been used for all the analysis. 
Testing stationarity 
Since we are using time series of income and health expenditure, the non-stationarity of 
the series can pose problems.  First step is to test that whether data is stationary or not.  
To check whether the data is stationary or not first step is to plot the data and observe 
how it behaves.  We plot GSDP and PHCE of all fourteen states and see that how it   22
behaves (See Figures 8 and 9).  These plots give a rough idea that how these variables 
are behaving across different states.  From Figure 8 we can see that GSDP shows 
upwards trend for all the states, which is expected also because we expect income to 
grow.  While modelling the data we need to take into account this characteristic.  But 
in Figure 9 we can see that there is no trend as such in PHCE. 
For using time series data test of unit rot is very important for testing stationarity.  
Here we are using panel data which is nothing but time series data for number of states 
so we will be using panel unit root tests.  For time series data testing for unit root is 
quite common now and there are lots of tests available for doing this.  But testing unit 
root in panel data is a recent phenomenon.  Levin and Li (1993) gave test for unit root 
in panel data but this and other tests of that time involved too restrictive assumptions 
on the slope parameters of pooled regressions.  Now there are more flexible tests 
available like IPS test (Im et. al. 1997) and MW test (Maddala and Wu 1999) based on 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) equation. 
The standard approach to test for non-stationarity of each observed time-series y 
observed over T time periods in a panel of is 1, . . . N, states is to estimate an 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) regression here including a time trend: 
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, 1 ε ρ β δ α , i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T 
where 1 , − − = ∆ t i it it y y y .  The number of lags p should be large enough to make the 
residuals serially uncorrelated.  The null hypothesis H0: βi = 0, that the data generating 
process for the series for panel group i can be characterised as a difference stationary I 
(1) process, are tested against the trend stationary alternative H1: βi < 0 based on the t-
statistic of the βi estimate see, e.g., Campbell and Perron, 1991 and Hamilton, 1994 for 
thorough treatments of the univariate unit root tests. 
Since unit root tests are known to have low power in distinguishing between the non-
stationary null and a stationary but persistent alternative, testing the individual state   23
series with only nine years of annual data the parameters of ADF equation will not 
give precise measures. 
Using the cross-section dimension of data can increase the power of unit rot test.  Im et 
al. treated data as N independent perhaps homogenous processes that either contain 
unit root or not.  Thus, as the time and the cross-section dimension increase, unit root 
test statistics can be derived that converge to normally distributed variables (Freeman, 
2003).  Im et al. proposed an approach to perform unit root tests for panel data
10 
Another test, which was performed, for unit root is MW (Maddala and Wu 1999) based 
on ADF equation
11.  If the two series have unit root and it is of the same order then the 
next step is to test for cointegration.  But if both the series does not show unit root 
then there is no need to test for cointegration. 
Computing elasticity 
As concerning the effect of per capita income, one major question of health economics 
(and applied econometrics) is the estimation of health care expenditure income 
elasticity.  From the literature per capita public healthcare expenditure by state 
governments is assumed to be a function of per capita gross state domestic product. 
The model is specified in log-log form so that the coefficient estimates are elasticity and 
therefore enable us to interpret the relationship of health care expenditures and 
income.  We use the following model to estimate this relationship:  
ln PHCEit = α + β1*ln SGDPit + ε 
where β1 will give the elasticity of PHCE with SGDP and ε is the residual.  
Method of estimation 
Another very important consideration in analysis of panel data is that whether it is a 
fixed effect (FE) model or a random effect (RE) model. The fixed effects model is a 
reasonable approach when we can be confident that the differences between units can 
be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression function.  This model might be viewed 
as applying only to the cross-sectional units in the study, not to additional ones outside   24
the sample.  For example, an inter-country comparison may well include the full set of 
countries for which it is reasonable to assume that the model is constant.  In other 
settings, it might be more appropriate to view individual specific constant terms as 
randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. This would be appropriate if we 
believed that sampled cross-sectional units were drawn from a large population. 
The generally accepted way of choosing between fixed and random effects is running a 
Hausman test. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less efficient 
but consistent model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent 
results.  
Given a model and data in which fixed effects estimation would be appropriate, a 
Hausman test tests whether random effects estimation would be almost as good. In a 
fixed-effects kind of case, the Hausman test is a test of H0: that random effect would be 
consistent and efficient, versus H1: that random effect would be inconsistent. (Note 
that fixed effects would certainly be consistent.) The result of the test is a vector of 
dimension k (dim(b)) which will be distributed chi-square.  So if the Hausman test 
statistic is large, one must use FE.  If the statistic is small, one uses random effect 
model. 
6.  Results 
 
Unit root and Stationarity tests 
Unit root tests were done on both ln PHCE and ln GSDP separately (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4:  Unit-root test statistics variables used in the study 
  Im et al.
# ADF-Fisher  Chi-
square
##  ADF - Choi Z-stat
## 
 t-statistics  probability  t-statistics probability  t-
statistics 
probability 
Per capita Public Healthcare Expenditure (PHCE) 
PHCE -0.9940    0.1601  31.903  0.2785  -0.97335  0.1652 
ln(PHCE) -1.0644    0.1436  32.4183  0.2578  -1.08736  0.1384 
         
Per capita Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) 
GSDP -2.46686  0.0068  51.1025  0.0049  -2.07862  0.0188 
ln(GSDP) -3.20194  0.0007  55.1817  0.0016  -2.62877  0.0043   25
            
Im et al. test and ADF test statistics for PHCE has been estimated with constant and for GSDP 
with constant and trend.  
# Probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality, 
## Probabilities for Fisher tests are 




While estimating presence of unit root in PHCE we used constant and it was found 
that PHCE does not show presence of unit root.  In both the tests i.e., Im et al. and 
ADF unit rot was not found.  This means that real per capita public health care 
expenditure is stationary. 
We can observe from the Figure 9 that GSDP shows presence of trend, therefore while 
estimating unit root in GSDP we estimate it in presence of constant and trend. Here 
also we see that we do not find evidence of unit root by both Im et al. and ADF tests. 
Therefore we can say that real per capita gross state domestic product is stationary. 
If we analyse at state level results are presented in Tables 5 and 6). 
Table 5:  Unit Root Test (Im et al.) 






  t-Stat Prob. t-Stat Prob.  t-Stat Prob.  t-Stat Prob. 
Andhra  Pradesh  -1.56  0.47 -2.36  0.38 -1.70  0.41 -3.12  0.15 
Assam  -2.24  0.20 -2.22  0.44 -2.26  0.20 -2.29  0.41 
Bihar -1.78  0.37  -0.39  0.97 -1.71  0.40 -0.62  0.95 
Gujarat  -2.98 0.07  (2)  -2.73 0.25  -3.00 0.07  (2)  -2.60 0.28 
Karnataka  -1.05  0.70 -2.07  0.51 -1.15  0.66 -2.67  0.26 
Kerala  -2.09 0.25  -4.23 0.03  (1)  -2.46 0.15  (1)  -3.27 0.12  (1) 
Madhya  Pradesh  -1.77 0.38  -3.65 0.07  (1)  -1.81 0.36  -3.40 0.10  (1) 
Maharashtra  -0.11  0.93 -2.48  0.33 -0.32  0.89 -1.92  0.58 
Orissa  -1.69  0.41 -7.76  0.00 -1.70  0.41 -9.00  0.00 
Punjab  -2.07 0.26  (2)  -3.50 0.09  -1.64 0.43  (1)  -4.36 0.03 
Rajasthan  -2.43  0.16 -2.94  0.19 -2.41  0.16 -3.23  0.13 
Tamil Nadu  -2.72  0.10 (2)  -2.79  0.23  -2.66  0.11 (2)  -2.40  0.36 
Uttar Pradesh  -0.33  0.89 (2)  -2.15  0.47  -0.34  0.88 (2)  -2.17  0.46 
West Bengal  -1.49  0.51  -0.66  0.95 -1.59  0.46 -1.71  0.69 
#  Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
++ Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends; Figures in bracket shows number of lags 
 
 
Table 6:  Unit Root Test (ADF) 








+   26
 Prob.  Prob.  Prob.  Prob. 
Andhra Pradesh  0.47  0.38  0.41  0.15 
Assam 0.20  0.44  0.20  0.41 
Bihar 0.37  0.97 0.40 0.96 
Gujarat 0.07  0.24  0.07  0.29 
Karnataka  0.70 0.51  0.66 0.27 
Kerala 0.25  0.03  0.15  0.12 
Madhya Pradesh  0.38  0.07  0.36  0.10 
Maharashtra  0.93 0.33  0.90 0.58 
Orissa 0.41  0.00  0.40  0.00 
Punjab 0.26  0.09  0.43  0.02 
Rajasthan 0.16  0.19  0.16  0.13 
Tamil Nadu  0.10  0.23  0.11  0.36 
Uttar Pradesh  0.89 0.48  0.89 0.46 
West Bengal  0.51  0.95 0.46 0.68 
#  Exogenous variables: Individual effects  
++ Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Figures in bracket shows number of lags 
 
From the above tables we can see that for PHCE Karnataka, Maharashtra and Uttar 
Pradesh shows presence of Unit root while for GSDP Bihar, and West Bengal shows 
presence of unit root.  Since both these series are stationary then there is no need to 
test for cointegration.  
 
Elasticity Computation 
It is also necessary to see that whether it is a fixed model or random model. Hausman 
test was used to determine that whether it is a fixed or random model.  
Table 7:  Estimation of elasticity using Panel Data Methods 
Model  Constant Variable  t-value  R
2 
OLS Without Group Dummy Variables  -1.649  0.653  18.144  0.646 
Least Squares with Group and Period 
Effects 
-2.207 0.714  07.023 0.918 
Random Effects Model  -1.932  0.684    0.830 
Hausman Test 
* 0.14       
* Hausman test favours Random Effect Model 
 
Three different models were used to calculate elasticity. From the Hausman test (H-
value 0.14) it was found that Random Effect model is appropriate for this case.  But we   27
see here that we did not found much difference between the coefficients of GSDP in all 
the three models.  Elasticity calculated by this method comes between 0.65 and 0.71 
(see Table 7).   
If we analyse at state level and the results are presented in Table 8.: 
Table 8:  Elasticity estimates of individual states 
State Constant  Variable  t-value  Adj.  R
2 F-Value 
Andhra Pradesh  2.19  0.23  1.63  0.017  1.20 
Assam  11.07  -0.79  -1.47  -0.044  0.49 
Bihar  1.25  0.30  0.93 -0.664 0.25 
Gujarat 1.50  0.32  2.17  0.142  2.98 
Karnataka 1.20  0.35  4.10  0.297  6.07 
Kerala 2.54  0.22  1.80  0.084  2.10 
Madhya Pradesh  0.30  0.42  2.49  0.082  2.07 
Maharashtra 2.79  0.17  1.22  0.004  1.04 
Orissa  3.83  0.02  0.09 -0.091 0.00 
Punjab -4.15  0.93  2.39  0.178  3.60 
Rajasthan 2.70  0.19  1.83  0.032  1.40 
Tamil Nadu  3.28  0.14  2.48  0.106  2.42 
Uttar Pradesh  24.52  -2.36  -6.41  0.660  24.30 
West Bengal  -0.39  0.52  3.58  0.386  8.53 
White heteroscedasticity robust covariance matrix 
 
7.  Target health expenditure of states 
The analysis presented in previous section suggests that for every one per cent increase 
in state per capita income, the state level health expenditure has gone up by 0.684 per 
cent.  Keeping this in view we would like to estimate what target PHCE/GSDP ratio 
states follow.  We use the methodology of adaptive expectation model and estimate 
that what is the targeted ratio of health expenditure as percent of GDP which 
governments incur on healthcare.  
Expectations are often important in economic models of dynamic processes, 
particularly in macroeconomic models, and finding ways to model them is often an 
important and difficult task for the applied economist using time series data.  The 
adaptive expectations model has been one of the earliest approaches developed for this   28
purpose.  Suppose that one hypothesise that target public health expenditure (PHCE
*)at 
time t is related to SGDP as follows:  
PHCE* = β0 + β1SGDPt + µt 
where β1 is target ratio of health spending as percent of SGDP.  One assumes that states 
are not spending exactly as per this ratio.  It aims to achieve this target over period of 
time with some speed of adjustment.  This can be modeled as follows: 
(PHCEt – PHCEt-1) =  δ (PHCEt
* - PHCEt-1) 
Simplifying this equation and substituting the value of PHCE
* in above equation gives 
us the following equation: 
PHCEt = δ PHCEt
* + (1-δ) PHCEt-1 
PHCEt = δβ0 + δβ1SGDPt + (1-δ) PHCEt-1 + δµt 
PHCEt = α0 + α1SGDPt + α2 PHCEt-1 + εt 
From the above we can estimate the elasticity as follows: 
β1 = α1 / (1-α2) 
Where β1 is target of SGDP which should be spent on PHCE. 
 
The estimation of above model using panel data poses some methodological problem.  
Though the panel estimation through fixed effect model and random effect model 
control for unobservable heterogeneity, because the specification of model is dynamic 
as it has lagged dependent variable as independent variable.  The presence of lagged 
dependent variable on right hand side causes considerable difficulty in estimation as the 
error term may be auto-correlated; but more seriously, the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term when we use fixed or random effects models (Greene, 
2003). The literature has suggested the use of instrumental variables (IV) estimators and 
panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator in estimation of dynamic 
models. Here to avoid the problems of heterogeneity and the biases caused by the 
lagged dependent variable, we use the panel GMM procedure based on Arellano and   29
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). The panel GMM estimator uses 
instrument variables. In our estimations, we use as instruments for lagged dependent 
right-hand side variable. The results of the GMM estimator based on Arellano and 
Bover (1995) are given in Table 9.  Estimation based on Arellano and Bover (1995) uses 
orthogonal deviations and it removes the individual effects. 
Table 9:  Estimation of target spending on health using  
Panel Generalized Methods of Moments estimation 
Variables Coefficient  t-Ratio
# 
PHCEt-1  0.548750 13.81
* 
GSDP 0.001943  16.95
* 
R-squared 0.3929   
Adjusted R-squared  0.3889   
S.E. of regression  7.4833   
Sargan statistic




β1 0.431%   
*  significant at 1 per cent level of significance 
#  t-stats are White heteroskedasticity corrected estimates 
##   Sargan’s Statistic is a specification test of overriding restrictions, 
which tests for the absence of correlation between the instruments 
and the error term 
 
From the above table we can see that the value of β1 is only 0.431 per cent.  This means 
that on average state governments in India has a target of 0.43 per cent of SGDP 
spending on healthcare.  This is percentage of income which governments will spend 
on health component..  This figure of 0.43% has very important implications at policy 
level. Government has said in its recently released common minimum programme that 
it wants to increase healthcare expenditure to 2 to 3 per cent of GDP.  The 
achievement of this goal critically depends on the state budget allocations to health 
sector.  Given the current levels of spending, the achievement of this goal looks very 
ambitious.  In order to achieve this goal the governments at state level need make 
significant reforms and prioritise the health sector.  This will require significant 
political will and change of mind-set.  The rising levels of SGDP also do not hold good 
promise.  For each one percent increase in SGDP the health expenditure will increase   30
by only 0.684 per cent.  Given the behaviour of health expenditures during last ten 
years the health goal looks formidable.   
8.  Conclusion 
Although over the last 50 years, India has shown improvements in its health 
infrastructure and broad health indicators, on public financing front it is at a far from 
satisfactory level.  Public spending on healthcare is low compared to the many 
countries in the world, having declined from 1.3 per cent of GDP in 1990 to around 
0.9 per cent of GDP in 2002, placing India amongst the lowest quintile of countries.  
Aggregate expenditure on health is around 6 per cent of GDP, implying only about 17 
per cent is met through public health spending, the balance by out-of-pocket 
expenditure. 
This paper has examined the relationship between income and healthcare expenditures 
at state level.  The findings suggest that at state level governments have target of 
allocating only about 0.43 per cent of SGDP to health and medical care.  This does not 
include the allocations received under central sponsored programmes such as family 
welfare.  Given this level of spending at current levels and fiscal position of state 
governments the goal of spending 2 to 3 per cent of GDP on health looks very 
ambitious task.  The analysis also suggests that elasticity of health expenditure when 
SGDP changes in only 0.68 which suggest that for every one percent increase in state 
per capita income the public healthcare expenditure has increased by around 0.68 per 
cent. 
In comparison to the public expenditure, private financing in health is significant and 
elasticity of private health expenditures with respect to income is also high about 1.95 
(Bhat and Jain 2004).  One important point to consider here is that whether these 
elasticities are income elasticity and are these comparable.  Private healthcare 
expenditures are generally demand driven and it depends on the consumers and their 
behaviour, therefore, elasticity of private expenditures will be income elasticity per se.  
Whereas public expenditure is different from private one because it is more supply 
driven.  In other words, public healthcare expenditure depends on how much   31
government allocates to healthcare in a given year.  However, these have implications 
for health policy.  The declining allocations to health sector at state level would have 
detrimental effect on public health delivery.  Given the less and declining allocations 
dependence on private sector grows.  This also explains why the private health 
expenditures have risen at very high rates.  The impacts are significant as private sector 
comprises mainly of profit oriented, ‘fee-for-service’ practitioners.  Private household 
expenditure is predominant in curative primary care, which accounts for about 46 
percent of total health expenditure. Secondary and tertiary (hospital) care accounts for 
27 percent of the total.  Although direct treatment costs in most public hospitals are 
largely subsidised, households have to bear substantial costs for purchase of medicines 
owing to shortages in public health facilities.  Illness imposes a heavy burden on the 
poor. A recent study estimated, for the poorest tenth of the population, it amounted to 
between 10 per cent (in Kerala) and 230 per cent (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and 
Bihar) of annual per capita consumption expenditure.  The top 10 percent of the 
population, however, bore a relatively lighter burden, as the average cost of treatment 
was between 5 percent and 40 per cent of annual per capita consumption expenditure 
of that class. 
Augmenting financial resources to health sector through public and private sources is 
important task.  However, simple allocation more resources to health sector may not 
produce desired efficiency.  Health sector is in need of major reforms.  Existing 
facilities in the health sector are not being used by people because of low quality, 
irregular attendance of medical staff, inadequate equipment, and poor maintenance and 
upkeep.  Some of these can be ensured through better allocation of resources.  Most of 
the problems are more systemic in nature and needs major reform to make health 
sector responsible.  The commitment and motivation of providers in public sector is 
critical to ensure that allocations produce desired results (Bhat and Maheshwari 2004).  
The reforms have focus not only on public domains of health sector but also private 
sector.  For example, a large number of private medical practitioners in rural areas are 
untrained and unqualified.  Lack of decentralisation has frequently led to a mismatch 
between local needs and the health services on offer, and to low accountability of   32
services and higher inefficiency.  A substantial proportion of the specialist posts in 
community health centres are vacant rendering many of them useless as first referral 
units.  At the same time, the ratio of qualified doctors to para-medical and nursing 
personnel is lop-sided in India. There are severe imbalances in India between public and 
private health care; and within public health care between preventive and curative 
services; between primary, secondary and tertiary health care services; and between 
salary expenses and other recurrent expenditures. 
The central and state governments are responsible for the provision of primary 
healthcare in the country. A spending of less than 1 per cent of the GDP on public 
health is not only dismally low but most of the expenditure is on staff salaries leaving 
little or nothing for facilities, drugs and other consumables. The large existing network 
of public primary care facilities can and should be used more effectively with the help 
of private partnerships to enable better delivery. Building better forward and backward 
linkages through a superior referral system would cause the secondary and tertiary care 
facilities to be more manageable and prevent them from being over burdened.   
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Exhibit 1: Estimated Income Elasticities by Level of Observation 
INDIVIDUALS    [Micro]   
General (insured/mixed)   
Newhouse & Phelps (1976)  0.1 
AMA (1978)  ≈ 0 
Sunshine & Dicker (1987) (NMCUES)  ≈ 0 
Manning et al (1987) (Rand)  ≈ 0 
Wedig (1988) (NMCUES)  ≈ 0 
Wagstaff et al (1991)  ≤ 0 
Hahn & Lefkowitz (1992) (NMES)  ≤ 0 
AHCPR (1997) (NMES)  ≤ 0 
Special / uninsured   
Pre-1960 Expenditure Data   
Falk et al (1933)  0.7 
Weeks 1961 (1955 data)  0.3 
Anderson et al (1960) (1953 data)  0.4 
Anderson et al (1960) (1958 data)  0.2 
Other      
USPHS (1960) (physician visits) 0.1 
USPHS (1960) (dental vistis)       0.8 
AMA (1978)  (dental expenses)     1.0 - 1.7 
Anderson & Benham (1970)  (physician expenses) 0.4 
Anderson & Benham (1970)  (dental expenses)      1.2 
Silver (1970)   (physician expenses)     0.85 
Silver (1970)   (dental expenses)      2.4 - 3.2 
Newman & Anderson 1972 (dental expenses)    0.8 
Feldstein (1973)  (dental expenses)     1.2 
Scanlon (1980)   (Nursing Home expenses)   2.2 
Sunshine & Dicker (1987)  (dental expenses)     0.7 - 1.5 
Hahn & Lefkowitz  (dental expenses)     1.0 
AHCPR (1997)  (dental expenses)   1.1 
Parker & Wong (1997)   (Mexico, total expenses) 
   
0.9 - 1.6 
REGIONS    [Intermediate]   
M.Feldstein  (1971)   (47 states 1958-67, $hospital)  0.5 
Fuchs & Kramer (1972)   (33 states 1966, $physician) 0.9 
Levit  (1982)   (50 states 1966, 1978, $total) 0.9 
McLaughlin (1987)   (25 SMSAs 1972-82 $hospital) 0.7 
Baker (1997)   (3073 US counties 1986-90, $Medicare) 0.8 
NATIONS    [Macro]   
Abel-Smith (1967)   (33 countries, 1961) 1.3 
Kleiman (1974)    (16 countries, 1968) 1.2 
Newhouse (1977)  (13 countries, 1972) 0.3 
Maxwell (1981)   (10 countries, 1975) 0.4 
Gertler & van der Gaag (1990)  (25 countries, 1975) 1.3 
Getzen (1990)   (United States, 1966-87) 1.6 
Schieber (1990)    (7 countries, 1960-87) 1.2 
Gerdtham et al (1992)   (19 countries, 1987) 1.2   34
Getzen & Poullier (1992) (19 countries, 1965-1986) 1.4 
Fogel (1999)   (United States, long run)     1.6 
Source: Getzen 2000 - Estimated income elasticity of health care expenditures (or utilization) from a 
variety of studies over the last 50 years.  Since methodologies vary and elasticities must be interpolated 
in many cases, readers are cautioned to carefully refer to original sources in the list of references.   35
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P  H  C  E Appendix 1 
Im et al. Test 
Since unit root tests are known to have low power in distinguishing between the non-
stationary null and a stationary but persistent alternative, testing the individual state 
series with only nine years of annual data the parameters of ADF equation will not 
give precise measures. 
Using the cross-section dimension of data can increase the power of unit rot test. Im et 
al. treated data as N independent perhaps homogenous processes that either contain 
unit root or not. Thus, as the time and the cross-section dimension increase, unit root 
test statistics can be derived that converge to normally distributed variables (Freeman, 
2003). 
Im et al. 1997 IPS proposed an approach to perform unit root tests for panel data based 
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Where tiT (pi) is the ADF t-statistic for country i based on the inclusion of pi lags in the 
country-specific ADF regression. 
The null hypothesis for the panel unit root test is given by 
H0 : βi = 0 for all i , 
specifying that all series in the panel have a unit root. This hypothesis is tested against 
the stationary alternative 
H1 : βi < 0, i =1,2, . . . ,N , βi = 0 i = N1+1 , N1+2, . . . , N, 
where βi is allowed to differ between groups and that only a fraction N1/N of the 
series are stationary. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected it is concluded that the 
panel data series are difference stationary around linear trends. 
Im et al. (1997) propose to use the following standardized t-bar statistic: 
      41
Where, ), 0 ) ( ( ) / 1 ( ) ( 1 = = ∑ = i i
N
i iT NT p t E N t E β I  and 
), 0 ) ( ( ) / 1 ( ) 1 ( = = ∑ = i i
N
i iT NT p t Var N t Var β I  assuming the country-specific ADF tests tit 
(pi) (estimated with pi lagged differences) are independent. 
IPS conjectured that the standardized Z statistic converge weakly to a standard normal 
distribution allowing the panel data unit root test to be conducted by comparing the 
obtained Zi statistic to critical values from a N (0,1) distribution. 
An important advantage of IPS over previous panel unit root tests is that it allows the 
data generating process to vary across country with respect to ADF coefficients and 
error structures. This can be particularly important with respect to the number of 
lagged difference terms in the ADF equation. 
Inspite of above advantages IPS test also have disadvantages. One important 
disadvantage is that the lag lengths, k, and the deterministic components are restricted 
to be same for all series. 
Clive Granger has shown that under some regularity conditions we can write a 
cointegrated process Xt as a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM): 
∆Xt = π0 + π1t + Π1∆Xt-1 + .... + Πp-1∆Xt-p+1 + αβ'Xt-p + Ut 
where ∆ is the difference operator (i.e., ∆Xt = Xt - Xt-1), the Ut's are i.i.d. (0,Σ), and  
π1 = αγ1  
for some r-vector γ1. The latter condition is called cointegrating restrictions on the trend 
parameters, and is necessary because otherwise Xt would be vector unit root process 
with linear drift (which is rare in practice). Thus  
∆Xt = π0 + Π1∆Xt-1 + .... + Πp-1∆Xt-p+1 + α[γ1t + β'Xt-p] + Ut.  
Since ∆Xt is stationary, we must have that γ1t + β'Xt-p is stationary, hence β'Xt is trend 
stationary.  
When do we need a time trend in the VECM? 
Most nonstationary macroeconomic time series such as the log of GDP have drift: they 
display a trending pattern with nonstationary fluctuations around the deterministic 
time trend. However, a VECM without a time trend,  
∆Xt = π0 + Π1∆Xt-1 + .... + Πp-1∆Xt-p+1 + αβ'Xt-p + Ut,    42
is able to generate drift in Xt because π0 acts (in some way) as a vector of drift 
parameters. Thus drift in the Xt process is no reason to include a time trend in the 
VECM.  
We should include a time trend in the VECM if we suspect that:  
·  The components of the vector β'Xt (or some of them) are trend stationary – 
We can often determine this by looking at the plots of the time series involved. 
For example, suppose that Xt is a bivariate cointegrated process, with 
cointegrating vector β = (1,-1)'. Then β'Xt = X1,t - X2,t is trend stationary if X1,t 
and X2,t veer apart, or loosely speaking, if the gap between X1,t and X2,t becomes 
wider (or narrower, but this is rare). 
·  Xt is trend stationary rather than a multivariate unit root with drift process – If 
so, the matrix αβ' will be of full rank (k), and then the VECM becomes a 
trend-stationary VAR(p) model for Xt. One of Johansen's cointegration tests, 
the trace test, has this as alternative hypothesis. 
Maddala and Wu Test 
The test suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999), is a test for the significance of the results 
from N independent tests of a hypothesis. Essentially the test combines the p-values of 
the test statistic for a unit root in each cross-sectional unit. If the test statistics are 
continuous, the significance levels pI (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,N) are independent uniform (0, 1) 
variables and -2 log pi  has a c
2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. Using the 
additive property of the c
2 variables, the following test statistic (with a c
2 distribution 
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An advantage of the test is that it be carried out for any unit root test, whether the null 
is one of integration or stationarity. 
Fixed and random effects models  
− When we have repeated observations per individual this is a problem and an 
advantage:  
o  the observations are not independent  
o  we can use the repetition to get better parameter estimates  
− If we pooled the observations and used e.g., OLS we would have biased estimates  
− If we fit fixed-effect or random-effect models which take account of the repetition we 
can control for fixed or random individual differences.    43
− In the econometrics literature these models are called `cross-sectional time-series' 
models, because we have time-series of observations at individual rather than aggregate 
level.  
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1 Ravi Duggal, Sunil Nandraj and Asha Vadair;  Health Expenditure Across States Part-I; Economic & 
Political Weekly, Vol. XXX, No.15, April 15, 1995, pp.834-844 
2 Source: Human Development Report 2003 
3 Harberger (1987) asks, “What do Thailand, the Dominican Republic, Zimbabwe, Greece and Bolivia 
have in common that merits their being put in the same regression analysis?” He concludes almost 
“nothing at all” and warns “He who puts them in the same regression should have a very good reason 
for doing so.” (p. 256) 
4 As concerning the effect of per capita income, one major question of health economics (and applied 
econometrics) is the value of health care expenditure income elasticity. If this elasticity is greater than 
unity, health care are a luxury good and their increase is a natural outcome of economic growth 
5 A general reference to the line, which shows the relationship between various quantities of a good a 
consumer, is willing to purchase at varying income levels (ceteris paribus). 
6 (Ernst Engel 1857, 2. edition, 1896b, s.28-29) – With rising incomes, the share of expenditures for food 
(and, by extension, other) products declines (Engel found, based on surveys of families' budgets and 
expenditure patterns, that the income elasticity of demand for food was relatively low). The resulting 
shift in expenditures affects demand patterns and employment structures. [Engel's Law does NOT 
suggest that the consumption of food products remains unchanged as income increases! It suggests that 
consumers increase their expenditures for food products (in % terms) less than their increases in income] 
7 Please refer Exhibit I 
8 Definition: Public Health Expenditure (PHE) is the sum of outlays on health paid for by taxes, social 
security contributions and external resources (without double-counting the government transfers to 
social security and extra-budgetary funds). 
9 Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh were bifurcated to make smaller states. 
10 Please refer Appendix 1 
11  Please refer Appendix 1 
 